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1. Introduction 
 
One option available to policy makers for increasing contributions to public goods is to introduce 
minimum contribution levels (MCLs). For example, some municipalities introduce minimum levels 
regarding the sorting of waste, while others introduce driving restrictions in order to contribute to the 
public good of clean air or of low emission levels. Other examples are requests of minimum monetary 
contributions in disaster relief or in keeping the sidewalks in front of one’s house free of snow and ice 
in winter; in the former case there are such practices in China after the Wenchuan earthquake, and in 
the latter case, there are certain minimum requirements established by law in Germany and Austria. 
Existing studies have analyzed the effects of an MCL, often framed as a tax, on voluntary 
contributions using public goods experiments (e.g., Andreoni, 1993; Chan et al., 2002; Sutter and 
Weck-Hanneman, 2004; Eckel et al., 2005; Gronberg et al., 2012). The general finding is that a 
minimum level does not completely crowd out voluntary contributions by reducing intrinsic 
motivations to contribute to the public good (for an in-depth discussion on motives, see, e.g., Bénabou 
and Tirole, 2006). In the context of principal-agent games where the principal can set a minimum 
effort level that has to be exerted by the agent, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) find that MCLs have a 
negative overall effect on voluntary contributions, while in a follow-up study Ziegelmeyer et al. 
(2012) do not generally find a similar effect. 
The objective of this paper is to provide a more detailed account of how contributions to a public 
good are affected by an MCL. To this end, we augment an incentivized version of eliciting individual 
cooperative preferences based on the strategy method (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher et al., 2008; 
Herrmann and Thöni, 2009; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Martinsson et al., 2013; Martinsson et al., 
2015) with two different MCLs. In the design introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001), individuals 
make two types of contribution decisions for the public good: (i) unconditional contributions and (ii) 
conditional contributions, i.e., what the subject would contribute to the public good given different 
average contribution levels by the other group members. The setup eliminates the strategic uncertainty 
that is inherent to social dilemma games, and thus lets us focus on the incentive effects of MCLs and 
their potential side effects. It allows for distinguishing between two types of players in a social 
dilemma (accounting for about three-fourths of the population): free riders, who contribute nothing 
regardless of the contributions of others, and conditional cooperators, who are willing to increase their 
own contribution if they know that others will do so as well (see also Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; 
Keser and van Winden, 2000). In our laboratory experiment, we implement two different MCLs – a 
low and a high (2 out of 20 and 7 out of 20 tokens, respectively) – in order to assess their potentially 
distinct impact on voluntary contributions. 
We are primarily interested in three effects of MCLs on the level of conditional cooperation: (i) 
Does the MCL affect those who are actually bound by the minimum level in addition to the pure effect 
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of introducing the MCL? For example, do subjects who contribute fewer or equal to 2 tokens without 
an MCL contribute exactly 2 tokens with an MCL=2? (ii) Is the distribution of contributions among 
those contributing more than the imposed minimum level unaffected by the introduction of the 
minimum level? And (iii), does the introduction of MCLs change the distribution of contributor types, 
i.e., does the distribution of free riders and conditional cooperators change? 
Our first experiment implements exogenous MCLs. The data show that decision makers are 
affected by MCLs and that the effects on contributions under the low MCL and the high MCL are 
different. In the case of a low MCL, average contributions remain largely the same as without an 
MCL, despite the forced increase in contributions for very low contributors. This is explained by a 
decrease in average contributions by those who have been willing to contribute more than the 
minimum requirement without the MCL already. Hence, there is crowding out. Under the higher 
MCL, conditional contributions among those contributing more than the minimum level already 
before the implementation of the MCL are also affected negatively. However, it seems that those who 
contribute less than the MCL without an MCL “overshoot” the MCL. Looking at the contribution 
schedules of the conditional contribution elicitation, we see that conditional cooperators decrease their 
contributions for MCL=2 (a smaller slope) compared to MCL=0, whereas the contribution function for 
MCL=7 looks almost identical to the one for MCL=0, taking into account the lower-limit censoring at 
2 and 7, respectively. 
Since the efficiency of institutional mechanisms may depend on how they are implemented (e.g., 
Tyran and Feld, 2006), we run a second experiment where MCLs are implemented endogenously. 
More precisely, we elicit preferences over the implementation of the MCL by letting group members 
choose whether to implement an MCL or not. One randomly selected group member’s choice then 
decides whether the MCL is implemented or not.1 Interestingly, we find less “overshooting” but also 
less crowding out compared to exogenously implemented MCLs. 
One explanation for the different impact of the two MCL regimes in both experiments is that 
MCLs could serve as signals, anchors, or reference points for intrinsically cooperative decision 
makers. While a low MCL drags the contribution of some decision makers slightly downwards, 
because the bulk of the distribution of contributions is above the MCL without any restriction, it could 
be the opposite for higher MCLs. Note however that any potential reference point effects are not as 
straightforward as they seem: We do not observe the mass of distribution of contributions moving 
exactly to the levels of the MCLs. In fact, the shifts are more gradual. As a practical implication of our 
results, it seems important not to introduce too low MCLs in the field in order to avoid potentially 
adverse reference point effects. 
                                                            
1 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the design and the results 
of our first experiment. In Section 3 we focus on our second experiment with endogenous MCLs. 
Section 4 discusses the results and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Experiment 1 – Exogenously imposed MCLs 
 
2.1 Design of Experiment 1 
Our experimental setup builds on the design by Fischbacher et al. (2001). It is a one-shot linear public 
goods experiment, using a variant of the strategy method. In the experiment, subjects were randomly 
matched into groups of four. Each member received an endowment of 20 tokens and had to decide 
how much to allocate to a private and a public good, respectively. The payoff function for subject i is 
given by 
∑
=
+−=
4
1
6.020
j
jii ccπ , (1) 
where ci denotes the contribution of subject i to the public good. In the experiment, each token 
was exchanged for 0.7 yuan.2 Assuming that subjects are selfish and rational, the dominant strategy 
for any marginal per capita return below one is to free ride, i.e., to contribute nothing to the public 
good. However, since the social return from any contribution to the public good was 2.4 tokens, 
everybody is better off if all group members contributed. Hence, the participants faced a social 
dilemma between privately optimal and socially optimal behavior. 
In the Fischbacher et al. (2001) design, subjects are asked to make two decisions: first an 
unconditional contribution to the public good and then a conditional contribution. The unconditional 
contribution is an integer number of tokens in the permissible range. Our three treatments (see 
Table 1) allow for ic [0,20]∈ (as in Fischbacher et al., 2001), ic [2,20]∈  (low MCL treatment), and 
ic [7,20]∈  (high MCL treatment). For the conditional contributions, each subject stated how much she 
would contribute to the public good for any possible average contribution of the three other players in 
her group (rounded to integers). In order to make each choice in the experiment incentive-compatible, 
both the unconditional and the conditional contribution must be potentially payoff-relevant. Thus, one 
of the four subjects was randomly selected, and her conditional contribution, corresponding to the 
average of the other three members’ unconditional contributions, was relevant as the contribution to 
                                                            
2 At the time of the Experiment 1 USD = 6.45 yuan. 
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the public account. Individual earnings can then be calculated according to equation (1).3 Essentially, 
the mechanism transforms the simultaneous public goods game into a sequential variant. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the experimental design. 
 
Note: MCL = minimum contribution level. 
 
We implemented a mixture of a within-subject and a between-subject design with full control for 
potential order effects. The design gives four combinations (sequences) of two one-shot public goods 
experiments (here denoted Part I and Part II), as summarized in Table 1, given that we always wanted 
to keep the comparison with the treatment MCL=0. There was no feedback between Part I and Part II. 
After conducting Part I, our subjects were randomly matched into groups with new members in Part II, 
i.e., we implemented a perfect stranger matching, and this procedure was common knowledge from 
the beginning of the experiment. Both parts were payoff-relevant. The experiment was run with 
context-free instructions. 4 It was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at 
Renmin University of China in Beijing. Average earnings amounted to 43.90 yuan.5 
 
2.2 Results of experiment 1 
We distinguish between results for unconditional contributions (Section 2.2.1) and results for 
conditional contributions (Section 2.2.2). 
 
2.2.1 Unconditional contributions 
We begin by testing whether order effects are present in our data. For each minimum level, we test 
whether unconditional contributions are the same in Part I and Part II. Since we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of no order effects in any of the combinations at the 5% significance level based on a two-
sided Mann-Whitney U-test, we pool the data over the different orders in the following analyses. The 
unconditional contributions with MCL=0 are well in line with comparable studies that use a similar 
one-shot design in other countries. Kocher et al. (2008), for instance, report averages for unconditional 
contributions of 8.11 in the U.S.A, 7.53 in Austria, and 7.22 in Japan. 
                                                            
3 Moreover, subjects in the experiment were asked to guess the average unconditional contribution of the other three group 
members (rounded to integers). The subjects were monetarily rewarded depending on the accuracy of their guesses as in 
Gächter and Renner (2010). 
4 Available from the authors upon request. 
5 For comparison, a lunch in the student restaurant cost 10 yuan at the time of the experiment. 
 Part I Part II No. of subjects 
Sequence 1 MCL=0 MCL=2 36 
Sequence 2 MCL=2 MCL=0 36 
Sequence 3 MCL=0 MCL=7 36 
Sequence 4 MCL=7 MCL=0 36 
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In Table 2, we summarize unconditional contributions to the public good. As expected, average 
contributions are higher when a minimum level of 7 is introduced (8.44 vs. 10.92), and this increase is 
significant at the 1% level compared with MCL=0, using a within-subject comparison (two-sided 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p < 0.01; N = 72). There is no significant change in the levels of 
contributions when a minimum level of 2 is introduced compared to MCL=0 (7.58 vs. 7.69). 
Comparing across treatments, contributions with MCL=7 are significantly higher at the 1% level than 
with MCL=2 (two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test, p < 0.01; N = 144). It is important to note that the 
baseline level of cooperation under MCL=0 is not significantly different between the two treatments, 
i.e. Sequences 1 and 2 versus Sequences 3 and 4 (two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.32; N = 144). 
 
Table 2. Average unconditional contributions (standard deviations in parentheses). 
Note: We use Mann-Whitney U-tests. Sequences 1 and 2: MCL=0-MCL=2 and MCL=2-MCL=0; Sequences 3 and 4: 
MCL=0-MCL=7 and MCL=7-MCL=0. 
 
We now look at two questions related to the effects of MCLs on the level of conditional 
cooperation: (i) Does the MCL affect those who are actually bound by the minimum level in addition 
to the pure effect of introducing the MCL? And: (ii) Is the distribution of contributions among those 
contributing more than the imposed minimum level unaffected by the introduction of the minimum 
level? Table 3 provides detailed analyses of the effects of introducing an MCL. If behavior is 
unaffected by the introduction of an MCL of 2 (of 7), the proportion of subjects contributing 2 (7) in 
treatment MCL=2 (MCL=7) is expected to be equal to the proportion contributing 0, 1, and 2 (0, 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) in treatment MCL=0.  
We start our analysis with the low MCL, i.e., MCL=2. In the case of MCL=2, 29.2% of decision 
makers contribute 2 tokens to the public good, compared with 30.6% contributing 0, 1, and 2 under 
MCL=0. If all decision makers that are bound by the MCL would contribute exactly 2 tokens in 
MCL=2, the average would be 2, obviously. However, the average contribution is 4.50 tokens under 
MCL=2. This difference between the “projected” contribution of 2 and actual average contributions is 
highly significant (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test comparing actual contribution levels and the 
projected level of 2, p < 0.01; N = 22). Interestingly, low contributors seem to “overshoot” the MCL 
on average. When looking at those who contribute more than 2 tokens under MCL=0, we observe 
averages of 10.76 when MCL=0 and 9.10 when MCL=2. Hence, on average, a highly significant 
 
Treatment 
MCL=0 MCL=2  MCL=7 
Sequences 1 and 2 7.58 (6.53) 7.69 (5.81)  
Sequences 3 and 4 8.44 (6.02)  10.92 (3.83) 
 
Null hypothesis                                                                
 
 
 
P-values 
Contributions in MCL=0 (Sequences 1 and 2) = MCL=0 (Sequences 3 
and 4) (N = 144) 
 
0.32 
Contributions in MCL=2 = MCL=7 (N = 144) < 0.01 
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crowding out effect occurs (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p < 0.01; N = 50). Taking the two 
groups together, the overall small change in average contributions from MCL=0 (7.58) to MCL=2 
(7.69) can be explained by the offsetting effects of “overshooting” the MCL and the occurrence of 
crowding out for contributors who contribute more than 2 tokens even when MCL=0. 
 
Table 3. Detailed descriptive statistics of unconditional contributions in the treatments.  
Note: We use two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests.  
 
We conduct an analogous analysis for MCL=7, compared with MCL=0. The proportion of 
decision makers contributing at most 7 when MCL=0 is 41.7%, while it is only 16.7% when MCL=7. 
We can thus confirm the behavioral regularity of “overshooting” that we observed under MCL=2. If 
Treatment Contributions 
considered 
Proportion of 
subjects 
Average 
contribution 
Sequences 1 and 2    
MCL=0 (contributions 0 to 2)  0,1,2 30.6% 0.36 
MCL=0 (contributions 3 to 20) 3,4,…,20 69.4% 10.76 
    
MCL=2 (contributions 2) 2 29.2% 2.00 
MCL=2 (contributions 3 to 20) 3,4…,20 70.8% 10.04 
    
MCL=2 (those who contribute 0,1,2 in 
MCL=0) 
 
ALL 
 
30.6% 
 
4.50 
MCL=2 (those who contribute > 2 in 
MCL=0) 
 
ALL 
 
69.4% 
 
9.10 
    
    
Sequences 3 and 4    
MCL=0 (contributions 0 to 7)  0,1,2,4,5,6,7 41.7% 2.90 
MCL=0 (contributions 8 to 20) 8,9…,20 58.3% 12.40 
    
MCL=7 (contributions 7) 7 16.7% 7.00 
MCL=7 (contributions 8 to 20) 8,9…,20 83.3% 11.70 
    
MCL=7(those who contribute 0,1,…,7 in 
MCL=0) 
 
ALL 
 
41.7% 
 
9.40 
MCL=7 (those who contribute > 7 in 
MCL=0) 
 
ALL 
 
58.3% 
 
12.00 
    
 
Null hypothesis  
 
 
  
P-values 
Sequences 1 and 2 
Contributions in MCL=2 of those who contribute 0,1,2 in MCL=0 are equal to 2 
 
< 0.01 
Contributions in MCL=2 of those who contribute > 2 in MCL=0 are equal in 
MCL=0 and MCL=2 
 
Sequences 3 and 4 
 
< 0.01 
Contributions in MCL=7 of those who contribute 0,1,…,7 in MCL=0 are equal to 7 <0.01 
Contributions in MCL=7 of those who contribute > 7 in MCL=0 are equal in 
MCL=0 and MCL=7 
 
0.60 
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all of our decision makers, contributing 0-7 tokens under MCL=0, would contribute exactly 7 tokens 
when MCL=7, the average contribution should be 7; however, their actual average contribution is 9.40 
tokens under MCL=7. The difference between the projected and actual average contributions is highly 
significant (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test comparing actual contribution levels and the 
projected level of 7, p < 0.01; N = 30). When looking at those who contribute more than 7 tokens 
without an MCL, we observe averages of 12.40 when MCL=0 and 12.00 when MCL=7. Our data 
therefore imply that, as for MCL=2, there is crowding out for MCL=7, yet it is relatively weaker and 
far from being significant (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.60; N = 42). The significant 
overall increase in contribution levels from MCL=0 (8.44 tokens) to MCL=7 (10.92 tokens) is a 
combination of the mechanical increase of contributions to the MCL, of “overshooting” of decisions 
makers who are forced to increase their contribution levels under MCL=7 compared to MCL=0, and of 
almost no crowding out effects of MCL=7 on those theoretically not bound by the MCL. 
Table 4 shows the transition matrix in the two treatments in order to give information on the 
distribution of changes when the MCL is introduced. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of decision 
makers either adjust exactly to the MCL if they contribute less without an MCL (i.e., they contribute 
exactly 2 and 7 if they contribute less than 2 and 7 without the relevant MCL) or stick with higher 
contributions when they already contributed more than the MCL before its introduction. If we take 
such behavior as a measure of stability across different institutional setups, 76.4% are classified as 
stable when an MCL=2 is introduced, and 66.7% behave in a stable way when an MCL=7 is 
implemented. A much more rigorous definition of stability is one that does not allow for changes at all 
across institutional environments, except for forced ones (increasing one’s contribution to the MCL if 
one contributed below this level without an MCL). For instance, if one contributes 1 token under 
MCL=0, then the only “stable” choice of the same person under MCL=2 is 2 tokens; if one contributes 
5 tokens under MCL=0, then the only “stable” choice of the same person under MCL=2 is also 5 
tokens. Taking such a strict definition, 40.3% of the decision makers submit stable decisions across 
MCL=0 and MCL=2, and 39. 0% of the decisions makers do the same across MCL=0 and MCL=7. 
 
Table 4. Transition probabilities in the treatments. 
 MCL=2 
MCL=0 Contribution > 2 Contribution = 2 
Contribution > 2 58.3% 11.1% 
Contribution = 0,1 or 2   12.5% 18.1% 
 
 MCL=7 
MCL=0 Contribution > 7 Contribution = 7 
Contribution > 7 54.2% 4.2% 
Contribution = 0,1,2,3,4,5,6 or 7 29.1% 12.5% 
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2.2.2 Conditional contributions 
Does the introduction of MCLs change the distribution of contributor types, i.e., does the distribution 
of free riders and conditional cooperators change? Figure 1 presents the average results from the 
contribution table. As expected, on average, the contributions increase as the average contributions of 
others increase, regardless of the MCL. Interestingly, however, while the slope in MCL=2 is smaller 
than in MCL=0 and, hence, the MCL does not increase average conditional contributions throughout 
the whole interval of others’ average contributions, the slope in MCL=7 is approximately similar to 
the one in MCL=0. As a consequence, conditional contributions are higher in MCL=7 than in the other 
two treatments, also in the range clearly above the lower censoring limit of 7. In order to study this 
effect further, we ran regressions to explain contributions as a function of others’ average 
contributions, clustering on the individual level in order to account for multiple entries for the 
individual. The results confirm the visual impression from Figure 1 and are available on request. 
 
Figure 1. Average conditional contribution (others’ average contributions on the horizontal axis and 
own average conditional contribution on the vertical axis). 
 
Note: PCC = perfect conditional cooperation.  
 
Based on the conditional contribution schedules, we can classify subjects into different types of 
contributors. We follow the convention (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001) and define four general types of 
subjects: conditional cooperators, free riders, hump-shaped contributors, and others. Here are the 
definitions that we use: If a subject’s conditional contribution increases weakly monotonically with the 
average contribution of the other group members, the subject is classified as a conditional cooperator. 
0
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A subject is also classified as a conditional cooperator if the relationship between own and others’ 
average contributions is positive and significant at the 1% significance level based on the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient. Hump-shaped contributors are subjects who show weakly monotonically 
increasing (or increasing with a Spearman rank correlation coefficient at the 1% significance level) 
contributions up to some, non-maximal level of others’ contributions; above that level, their 
conditional contributions decrease based on a reversed classification as the one used up to the 
inflection point. A free rider is a subject who contributes zero for all levels of the other group 
members’ contributions under MCL=0, 2 tokens under MCL=2, and 7 tokens under MCL=7. Finally, 
those who cannot be categorized into any of the above categories are referred to as others. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of contributor types at MCL=0 and MCL=2 (at individual level). 
 
 MCL=2 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators Free riders Hump-shaped Others 
MCL=0 
 
 
Conditional 
cooperators 33.3% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 
Free riders 6.9% 27.8% 5.6% 0.0% 
Hump-shaped 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 2.8% 
Others 1.4% 0.0% 2.8% 4.2% 
 
Table 6. Distribution of contributor types at MCL=0 and MCL=7 (at individual level). 
 
 MCL=7 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators Free riders Hump-shaped Others 
MCL=0 
 
 
Conditional 
cooperators 44.4% 8.3% 1.4% 0.0% 
Free riders 1.4% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hump-shaped 9.7% 2.8% 2.8% 1.4% 
Others 1.4% 0.0% 4.2% 5.6% 
 
Tables 5 and 6 report results on the stability of the classification across different MCLs by 
providing a transition matrix with regard to types. Overall, the distributions of contribution types are 
quite stable across MCLs (see Ruigrok et al., 2012, for an assessment of temporal stability of 
contribution types, but not across different institutional environments). The tables show, by looking at 
the diagonal, that a large proportion of subjects do display the same type of behavior under different 
institutional mechanisms. The few changes go in all directions and seem to be more or less random. 
Some conditional cooperators become free riders; particularly under MCL=7, these are decision 
makers who have an increasing contribution schedule under MCL=0 with a maximum contribution of 
7 tokens or less. Overall the distribution of conditional cooperators and free riders are not out of the 
ordinary (see for instance, Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher et al., 2008; Herrmann and Thöni, 2009; 
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Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Martinsson et al., 2013; Martinsson et al., 2015) and switches from 
one type to another are rare. 
 
 
3. Experiment 2 – Endogenously imposed MCLs 
 
3.1 Design of Experiment 2 
The setup follows Experiment 1 closely. As in Experiment 1, subjects were randomly matched into 
groups of four, and they made contribution decisions following the Fischbacher et al. (2001) design. 
Again, we implemented a mixture of a within-subject and a between-subject design with full control 
for potential order effects. The design gives four combinations (sequences) of two one-shot public 
goods experiments (denoted Part I and Part II), as already summarized in Table 1. The only new 
feature is the endogenous determination of the MCL: the experiment began with a “voting” stage 
where subjects indicated whether they wanted Part I or Part II to be payoff-relevant. This choice 
indicates the preference for either MCL=0 or MCL=2 in Sequences 1 and 2, and the preference for 
either MCL=0 or MCL=7 in Sequences 3 and 4. Once everyone had casted their vote, Experiment 2 
proceeded as Experiment 1. It was common knowledge that, in the end, one participant in each group 
would be randomly selected and her choice would be implemented (thus determining which part of the 
experiment would be payoff-relevant). This means that contribution decisions in both parts of the 
experiment were made in a situation where the MCL is endogenously imposed by one randomly 
selected group member. 
The experiment was run by using context-free instructions that followed the instructions in 
Experiment 1, except for the necessary changes to explain the choice.6 It was again computerized 
using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in the same experimental lab at Renmin University of 
China in Beijing as the first experiment. A total of 96 subjects participated in the experiment (24 in 
each sequence). Since only one part was payoff-relevant in Experiment 2 by the design of the 
endogenous mechanism, we doubled the exchange rate compared to Experiment 1 to make the 
monetary incentives comparable in the two experiments. Average earnings amounted to 44.0 yuan. 
 
3.2 Results of Experiment 2 
In order to facilitate comparisons of the two experiments, we proceed with our analysis of Experiment 
2 in the same way as for Experiment 1. We first present results for unconditional contributions 
(Section 3.2.1) and then results for conditional contributions (Section 3.2.2). Finally, we show the 
                                                            
6 The instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
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results on subjects’ choices for the implementation of the MCLs and also how they relate to 
unconditional contributions and the distribution of contribution types (Section 3.2.3). 
 
3.2.1 Unconditional contributions 
Since there are again no significant order effects, we pool the data over the different orders. 
Unconditional contributions are summarized in Table 7. One can see a significant increase in 
contributions following the introduction of a minimum level of 7 tokens (6.27 vs. 10.17) (two-sided 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p < 0.01; N = 48). There is also a small increase in contributions 
following a minimum level of 2 tokens, but it is only significant at the 10%-level (6.58 vs. 6.83) (two-
sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.09; N = 48). Qualitatively, overall unconditional contributions 
in Experiment 2 are very similar to the unconditional contributions in Experiment 1. 
 
Table 7. Average unconditional contributions (standard deviations in parentheses) for Experiment 2. 
Note: We use Mann-Whitney U-tests. Sequences 1 and 2: MCL=0-MCL=2 and MCL=2-MCL=0; Sequences 3 and 4: 
MCL=0-MCL=7 and MCL=7-MCL=0. 
 
We provide a more detailed analysis in Table 8. In the case of the low MCL of 2 tokens, 35.4% of 
our subjects contribute 2 tokens to the public good, compared with 33.3% contributing 0, 1, and 2 
under MCL=0. The average contribution in MCL=2 for this group of subjects is 2.25, and it is not 
significantly different from the “projected” contribution of exactly 2 (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test, p = 0.16; N = 16). For subjects who contribute more than 2 tokens under MCL=0, the 
average contribution decreases from 9.59 in MCL=0 to 9.13 in MCL=2, but the change is not 
significant on conventional levels (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.37; N = 32). Thus, in 
the case of a low MCL in our endogenous treatments, neither do we observe significant 
“overshooting” among low contributors, nor significant crowding out among high contributors. 
In case of the high MCL of 7 tokens, 43.8% of subjects contribute 7 tokens to the public good, 
compared to 60.4% contributing at most 7 tokens in MCL=0. We observe significant overshooting 
among this group of subjects, since the average contribution of 8.21 in MCL=7 is significantly 
different from the projected contribution of 7 (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p < 0.01; N = 
29). However, we do not see significant crowding out in MCL=7 for subjects who contribute more 
 
Treatment 
MCL=0 MCL=2  MCL=7 
Sequences 1 and 2 6.58 (5.93) 6.83 (5.49)  
Sequences 3 and 4 6.27 (5.74)  10.17 (4.46) 
 
Null hypothesis                                                                
 
 
 
P-values 
Contributions in MCL=0 (Sequences 1 and 2) = MCL=0 (Sequences 3 
and 4) (N = 96) 
 
0.77 
Contributions in MCL=2 = MCL=7 (N = 96) < 0.01 
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than 7 tokens under MCL=0 (11.89 vs. 13.16) (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test comparing 
contribution levels in MCL=0 and MCL=7, p = 0.21; N = 19). 
 
Table 8. Detailed descriptive statistics of unconditional contributions in the treatments for Experiment 
2. 
Note: We use two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests.  
 
Table 9 shows the transition matrix in the two treatments. As in Experiment 1, stability in 
MCL=2 entails either (i) a contribution of 0, 1, or 2 tokens in MCL=0 and exactly 2 tokens in MCL=2, 
or (ii) a contribution of more than 2 tokens in both MCL=0 and MCL=2; and likewise for decision 
Treatment Contributions 
considered 
Proportion of 
subjects 
Average 
contribution 
Sequences 1 and 2    
MCL=0 (contributions 0 to 2)  0,1,2 33.3% 0.56 
MCL=0 (contributions 3 to 20) 3,4…,20 66.7% 9.59 
    
MCL=2 (contributions 2) 2 35.4% 2.00 
MCL=2 (contributions 3 to 20) 3,4…,20 64.6% 9.48 
    
MCL=2 (those who contribute 0,1,2 in 
MCL=0) 
 
ALL 
 
33.3% 
 
2.25 
MCL=2 (those who contribute > 2 in 
MCL=0) 
 
ALL 
 
66.7% 
 
9.13 
    
    
Sequences 3 and 4    
MCL=0 (contributions 0 to 7)  0,1,2,4,5,6,7 60.4% 2.59 
MCL=0 (contributions 8 to 20) 8,9…,20 39.6% 11.89 
    
MCL=7 (contributions 7) 7 43.8% 7.00 
MCL=7 (contributions 8 to 20) 8,9…,20 56.2% 12.63 
    
MCL=7(those who contribute 0,1,…,7 in 
MCL=0) 
 
ALL 
 
60.4% 
 
8.21 
MCL=7 (those who contribute > 7 in 
MCL=0) 
 
ALL 
 
39.6% 
 
13.16 
    
 
Null hypothesis  
 
 
  
P-values 
Sequences 1 and 2 
Contributions in MCL=2 of those who contribute 0,1,2 in MCL=0 are equal to 2 
 
0.16 
Contributions in MCL=2 of those who contribute > 2 in MCL=0 are equal in 
MCL=0 and MCL=2 
 
Sequences 3 and 4 
 
0.37 
Contributions in MCL=7 of those who contribute 0,1,…,7 in MCL=0 are equal to 7 <0.01 
Contributions in MCL=7 of those who contribute > 7 in MCL=0 are equal in 
MCL=0 and MCL=7 
 
0.21 
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makers in MCL=7. Table 9 shows that stability levels according to our definition are high: 89.6% and 
79.3% in MCL=2 and MCL=7, respectively. 
 
 
Table 9. Transition probabilities in the treatments in Experiment 2. 
 MCL=2 
MCL=0 Contribution > 2 Contribution = 2 
Contribution > 2 60.4% 6.3% 
Contribution = 0,1 or 2   4.2% 29.2% 
 
 MCL=7 
MCL=0 Contribution > 7 Contribution = 7 
Contribution > 7 37.5% 2.1% 
Contribution = 0,1,2,3,4,5,6 or 7 18.8% 41.7% 
 
 
3.2.2 Conditional contributions 
Figure 2 presents the average results from the contribution table. By and large, the slopes for MCL=0, 
MCL=2, and MCL=7 are very similar to the ones in Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 2. Average conditional contribution in Experiment 2 (others’ average contributions on the 
horizontal axis and own average conditional contribution on the vertical axis). 
 
Note: PCC = perfect conditional cooperation.  
 
In a more detailed analysis we classify subjects into contribution types. The definitions are 
identical to the ones used in Experiment 1. In Tables 10 and 11 we present the transition matrices with 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
PCC MCL=0 MCL=2 MCL=7
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regard to the type classification across the different MCLs. The proportions shown on the diagonal 
indicate those who were classified as the same contribution type in the different MCLs.  
 
Table 10. Distribution of contributor types at MCL=0 and MCL=2 in Experiment 2 (at individual 
level). 
 
 MCL=2 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators Free riders Hump-shaped Others 
MCL=0 
 
 
Conditional 
cooperators 62.5% 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Free riders 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hump-shaped 2.1% 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 
Others 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Table 11. Distribution of contributor types at MCL=0 and MCL=7 in Experiment 2 (at individual 
level). 
 
 MCL=7 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators Free riders Hump-shaped Others 
MCL=0 
 
 
Conditional 
cooperators 56.3% 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Free riders 2.1% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hump-shaped 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 2.1% 
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 
 
 
3.2.3 Preferences for MCLs and contribution behavior 
In Table 12, we summarize unconditional contributions, separating the results by preference for MCL. 
A majority of subjects (66.6%) prefer MCL=2 to be payoff-relevant over MCL=0 in Sequences 1 and 
2, and almost everyone (87.5%) prefers MCL=7 over MCL=0 in Sequences 3 and 4. On average, 
unconditional contributions are higher for subjects who prefer non-zero MCLs. For example, in 
MCL=2, the average contribution is 7.78 tokens for subjects with a preference for MCL=2, and this is 
significantly larger than the average of 4.94 tokens for subjects who prefer MCL=0 (two-sided Mann-
Whitney U-test, p = 0.03; N = 48). Similarly, the average contribution for subjects with a preference 
for MCL=7 is 3.05 tokens larger than the average contribution from subjects with a preference for 
MCL=0 (two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.05; N = 48). 
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Table 12. Average unconditional contributions separated by preference for MCL. 
Treatment Preference MCL=0 MCL=2 MCL=7 
Sequences 1 and 2 MCL=0 (33.3%) 4.19 (5.52) 4.94 (4.82)  
Sequences 1 and 2 MCL=2 (66.6%) 7.78 (5.84) 7.78 (5.63)  
P-values  0.01 0.03  
     
Sequences 3 and 4 MCL=0 (12.5%) 3.50 (4.28)  7.50 (1.22) 
Sequences 3 and 4 MCL=7 (87.5%) 6.67 (5.85)  10.55 (4.63) 
P-values  0.19  0.05 
Note: We use Mann-Whitney U-tests. Sequences 1 and 2: MCL=0-MCL=2 and MCL=2-MCL=0; Sequences 3 and 4: 
MCL=0-MCL=7 and MCL=7-MCL=0. 
 
Tables 13–16 report results on the distribution of contribution types. By and large, one can see 
that the proportion of free riders is smaller with those who have a preference for non-zero MCLs. For 
example, while 43.7% of subjects who prefer MCL=0 are classified as free riders in MCL=2, only 
21.9% of subjects with the opposite preference are classified as free riders in the same situation 
(MCL=2). The pattern is similar but less pronounced for MCL=7. Taken together, the results on 
unconditional contributions and contribution types seem to indicate that subjects who prefer non-zero 
MCLs are more cooperative. 
 
Table 13. Distribution of contributor types at MCL=0 and MCL=2 (at individual level) for subjects 
who prefer MCL=0 (N = 16). 
 
 MCL=2 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators Free riders Hump-shaped Others 
MCL=0 
 
 
Conditional 
cooperators 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Free riders 0.0% 43.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hump-shaped 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Others 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Table 14. Distribution of contributor types at MCL=0 and MCL=2 (at individual level) for subjects 
who prefer MCL=2 (N = 32). 
 
 MCL=2 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators Free riders Hump-shaped Others 
MCL=0 
 
 
Conditional 
cooperators 68.8% 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Free riders 0.0% 15.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hump-shaped 3.1% 0.0% 6.3% 0.0% 
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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Table 15. Distribution of contributor types at MCL=0 and MCL=7 (at individual level) for subjects 
who prefer MCL=0 (N = 6). 
 
 MCL=7 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators Free riders Hump-shaped Others 
MCL=0 
 
 
Conditional 
cooperators 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Free riders 16.7% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hump-shaped 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
 
Table 16. Distribution of contributor types at MCL=0 and MCL=7 (at individual level) for subjects 
who prefer MCL=7 (N = 42). 
 
 MCL=7 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators Free riders Hump-shaped Others 
MCL=0 
 
 
Conditional 
cooperators 59.5% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Free riders 0.0% 23.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hump-shaped 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 2.4% 
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
We study different MCLs experimentally in a linear public goods game, where we elicit both 
unconditional and conditional contributions. An obvious direct effect of introducing a minimum level 
is that all subjects intending to contribute less than the minimum level have to increase their 
contributions. If this is the only behavioral change, the proportion contributing at most the introduced 
minimum contribution level before it is introduced is the same as the proportion contributing exactly 
the minimum level after it is introduced, resulting in an overall positive effect on contributions. 
However, there are two potential behavioral effects of introducing a minimum level: (i) the 
aforementioned proportion is not stable and (ii) the distributions of contributions among subjects 
contributing more than the imposed minimum level differ, when the minimum level requirement is 
imposed. 
Our experimental results indicate that decision makers are affected by MCLs, but, interestingly, 
the effects on contributions under the low MCL and the high MCL are not necessarily the same. Our 
first experiment investigates the effect of exogenous MCLs. In the case of a low MCL, average 
contributions remain largely the same as without an MCL, despite the forced increase in contributions 
for very low contributors. This is explained by the fact that the positive shift for low contributors – 
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indeed, on average, “overshooting” the MCL – is offset by a crowding out effect of the MCL for 
relatively high contributors. The latter effect is also present in our high MCL environment, but it is 
much less pronounced, making the former effect take over. Looking at the full contribution schedules 
of the conditional contribution elicitation, we see that conditional cooperators decrease their 
contributions under MCL=2 (a smaller slope) compared with MCL=0, whereas the contribution 
function for MCL=7 looks almost identical to the one for MCL=0, taking into account the lower-limit 
censoring at 2 and 7, respectively. 
In a second experiment, we investigate the effects of endogenous MCLs. The second experiment 
can also be seen as a robustness check for the results in Experiment 1, since the implementation of the 
common decision for the MCL is deliberately very weak. We have no voting, no group discussion, and 
no other form of group interaction that would give the MCL a stronger normative connotation. 
Nonetheless, in comparison with exogenous MCLs, the endogenous implementation of an MCL could 
send a signal of distrust to group members, similar to the hidden cost of control in Falk and Kosfeld 
(2006), crowding out voluntary cooperation. Comparing the effect of MCLs across the two 
experiments, we find that there is less “overshooting” but also less crowding out when MCLs are 
endogenously imposed by one randomly selected individual in each group. Overall, the endogenously 
implemented MCLs work marginally better than the exogenously implemented ones, but given the 
size of the difference, one has to be careful not to over-interpret the result. In any case, the endogenous 
implementation seems to induce a more stable behavior (less “overshooting” and crowding-out). If 
stability is an objective, an endogenous implementation should be preferred. Taking a look at the 
contribution schedules, MCL=2 leads to a steeper slope in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1; for 
MCL=7, we observe the reverse. However, the overall picture (positive slope) looks similar. When 
one wants to interpret the differences between the two experiments cautiously, one could argue that 
the endogenous MCL sends a positive signal to the group members rather than one of mistrust. 
However, one has to be careful in directly comparing results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 was added later on, following the request of a referee. Given that some time has passed 
between the two experiments, it is unclear whether we can assume full randomization of participants 
across the two experiments. Within the experiments, this is not an issue, but across the experiments the 
subject pool might have changed in dimensions that are difficult to observe (e.g., cohort effects). 
One general explanation for our results is that MCLs might serve as signals, anchors, or reference 
points to intrinsically cooperative decision makers. Although future research has to look deeper into 
the relationship between MCLs and behavioral responses, it seems that higher MCLs shift contribution 
levels upwards without resulting in crowding out. While a low MCL seems to drag the contribution of 
some decision makers downwards, because the bulk of the distribution of contributions is above the 
MCL without any restriction, it seems that a higher MCL has the opposite behavioral effect. However, 
any reference point effect is more involved than a simple clustering, since we do not observe 
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significantly more mass exactly at the levels of the introduced minimum contributions. The shifts and 
crowding out effects are more gradual and particularly affect decision makers way above the MCLs. In 
principle, these results are consistent with the findings of Falk and Kosfeld (2006), which seem to 
indicate that the effect of minimum control on profits is non-monotonic, with low levels of control 
generating lower profits. Similarly, Wang (2012) finds that when a minimum wage policy is 
introduced, the signaling or anchoring effect of a low level of the minimum wage results in a strong 
negative effect on wages offered by firms. However, Ziegelmeyer et al. (2012) do not generally 
observe a hidden cost of control in a follow-up study based on Falk and Kosfeld (2006), and, 
moreover, the results from our second experiment using endogenous MCLs do not fully support an 
interpretation where the MCL sends a strong signal of distrust. Thus, more research seems warranted 
to better understand the psychology behind the effects. A natural extension of our setup, for instance, 
would introduce an MCL that is not fully binding but that involves a monitoring or auditing 
mechanism in order to increase compliance. 
MCLs seem to be fairly independent of how they are imposed and this is a relevant result for 
policy makers. Additionally, our result of crowding out at low MCLs is a significant finding, since in 
most cases the only feasible MCL for policy makers is to impose a low MCL, which should be 
evaluated against the case of no MCL at all, or even better a higher MCL. Potential reference point 
effects seem to be less straightforward in an environment with MCLs. Interestingly, crowding out 
appears to become less relevant when the minimum requirement is higher; intuitively, one would 
probably have expected the opposite. 
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